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The objective of the study is to find out the impact of audit 
quality on earnings management. The study used a sample 
of all eighteen banks quoted on the stock exchange as at 
December, 2010. Data was gathered for the period 2005 
to 2010. The cross-sectional year by year regression 
analysis was performed. Audit quality is measured by 
using audit fees and auditor change, and abnormal loan 
loss provision is used to measure earnings management. 
Though the result was mixed,  however, based on the 
frequency of results for the period of the study, both audit 
fee and auditor change were positively related to 
abnormal loan loss provision. This suggests that high audit 
fee and change in auditor tenure will aggravate earnings 
management. We recommend that auditor change should 
not be ceremonial but based on fact of inefficiency and 
audit fee from each auditor client should be monitored to 
enforce the five per cent maximum from each client as 
























financial	 system	 in	 particular.	 Bank	 distresses	 in	 Nigeria	 are	 a	 recurring	 decimal.	




in	 banks.	 One	 of	 the	 focuses	 of	 this	 Prudential	 Guideline	 is	 to	 deal	 with	 accounts	
manipulation	 occasioned	 by	 earnings	 management.	 The	 Prudential	 Guideline	 (2010)	
regulated	 the	 tenure	 of	 external	 auditors.	 The	 guideline	 states	 that	 the	 tenure	 of	 the	
external	 audit	 should	 not	 exceed	 ten	 years	 from	 the	 date	 of	 first	 appointment.	 This	 is	
because	there	are	empirical	and	practical	evidences	that	long	audit	tenure	compromise	
audit	 and	 quality	 leads	 corporate	 failure	 (Becker,	 DeFond,	 Jiambalvo	 and	
Subramanyam	,1998;	Gerayli,	Yanesari	and	Ma'atoofi,	2011).	In	particular,	the	demise	of	
Enron	 and	 Anderson	 clearly	 shows	 the	 importance	 of	 audit	 quality	 in	 constraining	
accounts	 manipulation.	 The	 Cadbury	 and	 Akintola	 Williams	 Delloite	 (AWD)	 case	 of	
fraudulent	financial	reporting	also	demonstrates	the	relationship	between	audit	quality	




detects	 an	 anomaly	 in	 financial	 statements,	 and	 then	 reveals	 it	 to	 the	 users	 of	 these	
statements.	 This	 definition	 ascribes	 audit	 quality	 to	 both	 competence	 and	 integrity	 of	
auditor.	 It	 takes	 competence	 to	 detect	 anomaly	 and	 integrity	 to	 disclose	 it.	 Audit	











and	audit	 fees.	Abnormal	 loan	 loss	provision	has	been	adjudged	as	more	suitable	 than	
abnormal	accruals	as	a	measure	of	earnings	management	for	banks	because	banks	have	











Prior	 studies,	 like	Chen	et	 al.,	 (2005),	Piot	 and	 Janin	 (2005)	 and	Gerayli,	 Yanesari	 and		
Ma'atoofi,	(2011)	examined	whether	there	is	a	nexus	between	earnings	management	and	








audit	 quality.	 They	 used	 abnormal	 accruals	 to	 measure	 earnings	 management	 and	
presence	 of	 big	 five	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 audit	 quality.	 Gerayli	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 considered	 the	






showed	 a	 negative	 association	 with	 auditor	 size	 and	 auditor	 industry	 Specialization.	
Furthermore,	 they	 find	 negative	 association	 between	 auditor	 independence	 and	
discretionary	accruals.	 Summarily,	 their	 study	 suggests	 that	high	audit	quality	 is	more	
likely	to	constrain	earnings	management	than	low	quality.	This	result	agrees	with	prior	





client	 affiliation.	 Geiger	 and	 Raghunandan	 (2002)	 finds	 that	 corporate	 failure	 occurs	
considerably	more	 often	 in	 the	 first	 five	 years	 of	 an	 auditor-client	 association.	Myers,	
Myers	and	Omer	(2003)	find	that	risky	accounting	choices	are	inhibited	more	effectively	




However,	 standard	 setters	 and	 regulatory	 authorities	 believe	 that	 longer	 audit	 tenure	
encourages	earnings	management.	They	therefore	make	audit-client	rotation	mandatory.	
In	the	United	States,	the	Sabane-Oxley	Act	2002	reduced	the	auditor	tenure	from	seven	to	
five	years.	While	 the	Prudential	Guideline	2010	 in	Nigeria	 limits	auditor	 tenure	 to	 ten	
years	and	the	European	Commission	limits	it	to	seven-year.		
Audit	 fee	 is	 often	 used	 to	 proxy	 auditor	 independence	 and	 hence	 audit	 quality.		
Kanagaretnam	et	al.	 (2010)	examine	auditor	 independence	 in	 the	banking	 industry	by	
analysing	 the	 relation	 between	 fees	 paid	 to	 auditors	 and	 the	 extent	 of	 earnings	
management	through	loan	loss	provisions	LLP.	They	find	that	unexpected	audit	fees	are	
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Measurement of Variables 

















:) ! <ℎ"	 Dichotomous	 variable,	 1	 if	 Auditor	
























	 2005	 2006	 2007	
VARIABLES:		 Coef	 p-value	 Coef	 p-value	 Coef	 P-value	
			AUDCH	 -
8.65E+08	
0.27	 5.44E+08	 0.25	 6.81E+08	 0.38	
			AUDFEE	 22883153	 0.44	 1210292	 0.01	 -38709	 0.87	
R2	 	 0.17	 	 0.40	 	 0.17	
Adjusted	R2	 	 -0.02	 	 0.26	 	 -0.02	
F-statistic	 	 0.88	 	 2.83	 	 0.91	
P-value	 	 (0.47)	 	 (0.07)	 	 (0.46)	





















Table 2 Regression results for 2008-2010 
 2008 2009 2010 
VARIABLES:  Coef p-value Coef. p-value Coef p-value 
   AUDCH 2.71E+09 0.42 1.70E+10 0.32 -7.53E+09 0.31 
   AUDFEE 6982058 0.89 -
61964660 
0.61 9.31E+07 0.33 
R2  0.04  0.12  0.16 
Adjusted R2  -0.08  -0.09  0.00 
F-statistic  0.34  0.57  0.81 
P-value  (0.71)  (0.64)  (0.50) 
DW-stat  1.69  1.86  1.90 
Source: Author’s Computation using E-views 7.0 
Conclusion and recommendations 
The	 study	 shows	 the	 inconclusiveness	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 audit	 quality	 and	
earnings	management.	This	inconclusiveness	suggests	the	need	for	improving	method	of	
analysis	and	developing	new	proxies	for	audit	quality	and	earnings	management.	Using	
audit	 fee	and	auditor	 change	as	proxy	 for	audit	quality	has	provided	 researchers	with	
mixed	results.	Probably	a	better	measure	of	audit	quality	would	be	from	the	viewpoint	of	
the	audit	firm.	A	measure	of	audit	quality	that	combines	auditor	competence	and	auditor	
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Dependent Variable: ABLL 
   
Method: Least Squares 
   
Date: 09/07/14   Time: 16:15 
  
Sample (adjusted): 2 18 
   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments 
 
Convergence achieved after 2 iterations 
  
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
AUDCH -8.65E+08 7.46E+08 -1.158917 0.2673 
AUDFEE 22883153 28761306 0.795623 0.4405 
C 2.02E+08 1.13E+09 0.17811 0.8614 
AR(1) -0.219795 0.310683 -0.707458 0.4918 
     
R-squared 0.169562     Mean dependent var 27788498 
Adjusted R-squared -0.022078     S.D. dependent var 1.01E+09 
S.E. of regression 1.02E+09     Akaike info criterion 44.53569 
Sum squared resid 1.37E+19     Schwarz criterion 44.73174 
Log likelihood -374.5534     Hannan-Quinn criter. 44.55518 
F-statistic 0.884794     Durbin-Watson stat 1.888908 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.474565 
   
     
Inverted AR Roots -0.22 
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Variable	 Coefficient	 Std.	Error	 t-Statistic	 Prob.			
	 	 	 	 	
C	 -8.71E+08	 3.87E+08	 -2.249074	 0.0425	
AUDCH	 5.44E+08	 4.53E+08	 1.201248	 0.2511	
AUDFEE	 1210292	 359377.8	 3.367744	 0.005	
AR(1)	 -0.425735	 0.181602	 -2.344323	 0.0356	
	 	 	 	 	
R-squared	 0.39518	 				Mean	dependent	var	 -3.96E+08	
Adjusted	R-squared	 0.255606	 				S.D.	dependent	var	 7.75E+08	
S.E.	of	regression	 6.68E+08	 				Akaike	info	criterion	 43.68119	
Sum	squared	resid	 5.81E+18	 				Schwarz	criterion	 43.87724	
Log	likelihood	 -367.2901	 				Hannan-Quinn	criter.	 43.70067	
F-statistic	 2.83133	 				Durbin-Watson	stat	 2.156609	
Prob(F-statistic)	 0.079605	
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Variable	 Coefficient	 Std.	Error	 t-Statistic	 Prob.			
	 	 	 	 	
C	 -4.74E+08	 6.67E+08	 -0.71037	 0.49	
AUDCH	 6.81E+08	 7.55E+08	 0.902446	 0.3832	
AUDFEE	 -38709	 243043	 -0.15927	 0.8759	
AR(1)	 -0.280727	 0.253904	 -1.10564	 0.2889	
	 	 	 	 	
R-squared	 0.173359	 				Mean	dependent	var	 99198670	
Adjusted	R-squared	 -0.017405	 				S.D.	dependent	var	 1.05E+09	
S.E.	of	regression	 1.05E+09	 				Akaike	info	criterion	 44.59341	
Sum	squared	resid	 1.45E+19	 				Schwarz	criterion	 44.78946	
Log	likelihood	 -375.044	 				Hannan-Quinn	criter.	 44.61289	
F-statistic	 0.908762	 				Durbin-Watson	stat	 2.030198	
Prob(F-statistic)	 0.463526	
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Included	observations:	18	
	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
Variable	 Coefficient	 Std.	Error	 t-Statistic	 Prob.			
	 	 	 	 	
C	 -3.15E+09	 5.85E+09	 -0.537991	 0.5985	
AUDCH	 2.71E+09	 3.27E+09	 0.828903	 0.4202	
AUDFEE	 6982058	 53382096	 0.130794	 0.8977	
	 	 	 	 	
R-squared	 0.04391	 				Mean	dependent	var	 -2.63E+08	
Adjusted	R-squared	 -0.083569	 				S.D.	dependent	var	 4.95E+09	
S.E.	of	regression	 5.15E+09	 				Akaike	info	criterion	 47.7127	
Sum	squared	resid	 3.98E+20	 				Schwarz	criterion	 47.86109	
Log	likelihood	 -426.4143	 				F-statistic	 0.344449	


















REGRESSION RESULT Earnings management and Audit Quality (Abnormal loss 














	 	 	 	 	
Variable	 Coefficient	 Std.	Error	 t-Statistic	 Prob.			
	 	 	 	 	
C	 -9.40E+09	 1.13E+10	 -0.82846	 0.4224	
AUDFEE	
-
61964660	 1.19E+08	 -0.52106	 0.6111	
AUDCH	 1.70E+10	 1.65E+10	 1.033195	 0.3204	
AR(1)	 0.349967	 0.449102	 0.779259	 0.4498	
	 	 	 	 	
R-squared	 0.116779	 				Mean	dependent	var	 -3.05E+08	
Adjusted	R-squared	 -0.087042	 				S.D.	dependent	var	 1.30E+10	
S.E.	of	regression	 1.35E+10	 				Akaike	info	criterion	 49.69534	
Sum	squared	resid	 2.38E+21	 				Schwarz	criterion	 49.89139	
Log	likelihood	 -418.4104	 				F-statistic	 0.572949	
Durbin-Watson	stat	 1.859165	 				Prob(F-statistic)	 0.642759	
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Dependent Variable: ABLL 
    
Method: Least Squares 
    
Date: 09/07/14   Time: 19:54 
    
Sample(adjusted): 2 18 
    
Included observations: 17 after adjusting endpoints 
  
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations 
   
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
      
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
t-
Statistic Prob.   
 
      
C 3.30E+10 3.90E+10 0.8475 0.4121 
 
AUDFEE 9.31E+07 9.25E+07 1.006 0.3328 
 
AUDCOM -7.53E+09 7.12E+09 -1.058 0.3094 
 
AR(1) 0.238377 0.294821 0.8085 4.33E-01 
 
      
R-squared 1.59E-01     Mean dependent var -1.11E+09 
 
Adjusted R-squared -3.52E-02     S.D. dependent var 1.62E+10 
 
S.E. of regression 1.65E+10     Akaike info criterion 50.09396 
 
Sum squared resid 3.54E+21     Schwarz criterion 50.29001 
 
Log likelihood -421.7987     F-statistic 0.818791 
 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.859095     Prob(F-statistic) 0.506312 
 
